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(Resumen) 
Tras una larga y tortuosa patemalista-colonial, Hispanoamérica y los 
hispanoamericanos constituyen, de manera vital y pujante, lo que muchos consideran como el 
legado cultural más importante de España al mundo del Siglo XX. En las últimas décadas este 
legado se ha extendido, y continúa extendiéndose, a pasos agigantados; tal es la tasa de 
crecimiento de este segmento de la población estadounidense que se calcula que podría 
representar, en apenas 50 años, una cuarta parte de la misma. El artículo a continuación tiene 
por objeto analizar las características socioeconómicas más notables de dicho segmento, cuya 
composición es sumamente heterogénea y fragmentada en distintas regiones del país. Para 
España la diáspora hispanoamericana a través de los Estados Unidos significa no sólo el 
restablecimiento de su hegemonía cultural en Norteamérica, sucumbida ante la presión 
anglosajona desde hace mucho tiempo, sino también, en términos más pragmáticos, la apertura 
de innumerables y prósperos mercados, tanto de insumos como de bienes y servicios. 
Hispanics constitute one of the most dynamic segments of the U.S. population. Their 
presence has grown from 14.6 million persons in 1980 to 22.4 million in 1990 and an estimated 
26.8 million persons, approximately 10.2 percent of the total, in 1995 [U.S. Bureau of the 
Census, 1994]'. If expected fertility, mortality, and intemational migration trends persist, 
Hispanics in the United States are expected to reach 31.2 million by the tum of the century. 
outnumbering Blacks shortly thereafter. Depending on the assumptions behind various models 
of demographic expansión, they may account for as much as a quarter of the country's 
population by the year 2050 [Exter, 1987; U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993]. 
Although the existence of a significant Hispanic component throughout some regions 
is by no means a recent phenomenon, the ongoing aggregate demographic explosión of 
Hispanics can be traced back to the I960s. Their relative paucity up to a couple of decades ago 
is underscored by the fact that, not until 1973, did the U.S. Census Bureau feel the need to 
formúlate a definition of "persons of Hispanic origin" based on self-identification of 
respondents and publish data systematically on their socioeconomic characteristics. As 
DePreitas [ 1991 ] points out, prior to 1973 the censi, taken every ten years, were the only source 
of Information on this segment of the population. However, the frequently changing criteria 
1. The Current Population Survey is taken annually by the U.S. Bureau of the Census. Its 
uni verse consists of the civilian, noninstitutional population of the United States and members 
of the Arnied Forces in the United States living off post or with their families on post, but 
exeludes all other members of the Armed Forces. 
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used for identifying persons of Hispanic origin have reduced the accuracy of longitudinal 
comparisons. 
According to the practices currently in effect, a person is considered to be of Hispanic 
origin or descent if he/she "identifies his or her ancestry as Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or 
other Spanish origin or culture regardless of race" [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993, p. 1]. This 
definition transcends race and focuses on ethnicity. Origin or descent is viewed as the 
nationality group, lineage, or country in which the person or his/her ancestors, no matter how 
many past generations, were bom. Thus, a person could identify himself/herself as a Hispanic 
based on his/her country of birth, the country of birth of a parent, or the country of birth of 
some far removed ancestor. 
The study of U.S. Híspanles' socioeconomic characteristics and behavior pattems is 
important to scholars and policymakers everywhere because of the rapidly growing labor 
capacity, consumption potential, and purchasing power of this ethnic group. But it also has 
broader implications. For exampie, insofar as one-third of all Hispanics of labor forcé age are 
foreign-bom, an analysis of their characteristics and behavior provides the opportunity to 
explore the impact of intergenerationai mobility on labor market outcomes, as well as the role 
of ethnicity in determining individual success and adjustments of labor markets to large shifts 
in the supply of workers [Borjas and Tienda, 1985]. Hispanics' integration experiences also are 
relevant to research and policymaking regarding whether Hispanics migrate to the United 
States seeking to become ftill-fledged members of American society, as did numerous 
European immigrants who preceded them, or, as has been alieged, they represent a disruptive 
influence, when they resist joining mainstream America [Fuchs, 1990; Pachón and DeSipio, 
1994; Schlesinger, 1991] or even a threat, in terms of displacing and taking jobs away from 
Blacks and other disadvantaged minorities [Briggs, 1973]. 
U.S. Hispanics' characteristics and behavior are particularly appealing to scholars and 
policymakers in Spain because the expansión of this group is tantamount to a reaffirmation of 
the Spanish cultural legacy and hegemony forsaken in North America many years ago. The 
chivalrous and gallant might perceive it as a lógica! step leading to Spain's attainment of its 
worldwide manifest destiny, perhaps even as a matter of national pride, whiie the utilitarian 
would view it as a formidable source of both input and output markets as well as of investment 
opportunities. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a profile of Hispanics in the United States 
based on population census and Current Population Survey' data, plus other sources; compare 
some of their socioeconomic indicators with those of non-Hispanic segments; and analyze 
variations in these indicators among the major Hispanic subgroups. Four áreas comprise this 
profile. First, similarities and differences of historical, cultural, and adaptive nature are 
established among the subgroups. Second, a review of general population characteristics such 
as growth, concentration, age, marital status, household composition, and number of children 
takes place. This review is followed by an analysis of economic characteristics which 
encompass eamings, income distribution, poverty, unemployment, labor forcé participation, 
and occupational structure. Finally, there is a discussion of social characteristics inciuding 
formal schooling, ability to speak English, incidence of foreign bom, discrimination, and 
receipt of Means-tested Assistance. 
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/. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES 
According to the 1990 Population Census [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992], three-
flfths (60.4 percent) of the U.S. Hispanic population are Mexican. Puerto Ricans, the second 
largest subgroup, constitute 12.2 percent, while Cubans, a small but economically powerful 
subgroup, account for 4.7 percent. The remaining 22.7 percent are classified as other 
Hispanics, mostly from Central and South American origin. Data from the 1993 Current 
Population Survey [Montgomery, 1994] show a similar distribution: 64.3 percent Mexican, 
10.6 percent Puerto Rican, 4.7 percent Cuban, and 20.4 percent other Hispanic. These 
subgroups form a heterogeneous mosaic. They have joined the larger American population in 
different manners at difTerent times, and have encountered dissimilar experiences in their 
respective socioeconomic, political, and environmental settings [Melendez, Rodríguez, and 
Figueroa, 1991]. 
Originally, Mexican Americans became a minority not by immigrating (as the other 
Hispanic subgroups) or being forcefuUy brought to the New World in slavery (as were Blacks). 
but by conquest. When today's áreas of Arizona, California, New México, and Texas were 
taken away from México in mid nineteenth century, their indigenous inhabitants became de 
facto second-class citizens subservient to Non-Hispanic White settiers [Kerr, 1992]. As time 
went on and income and wealth inequalities between México and the United States intensified, 
both legal and illegal massive migration across the border ensued. Surplus labor conditions in 
Mexico's agricultural economy pushed Mexicans to migrate to áreas in the United States 
capable of generating a greater demand for labor. Most arrivals remained in the Southwest, 
particularly the border states. 
Puerto Ricans who move to the mainland tend to concéntrate in New York, New 
Jersey, and other áreas of the Northeast. Their migration also is linked to surplus labor 
conditions at home, although their demand for jobs is mainly in manufacturing and services. 
Since they are U.S. citizens by birth, there is no restriction or illegal immigration problems 
with this subgroup. Puerto Ricans began migrating to the United States shortly after their island 
was relinquished by Spain at the end of the Spanish-American War, the heaviest flow taking 
place between 1940 and 1960. 
Unlike Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, whose migrations respond primarily to economic 
factors, the Cuban diaspora, especially in the beginning, was politically motivated. In the 1960s 
and early 1970s it consisted of professionals, managers, and former govemment officials who 
would not or could not adapt to a Marxist regime. With the advent ofMarielilos and rafters, the 
latest Cuban migration waves are characterized by their younger, poorer, and less skilled nature 
[Morales and Bonilla, 1993]. An important feature of this subgroup is that, until recently, 
Cubans have received massive amounts of govemment-sponsored human-capital and 
resettlement assistance in the form of job training and placement, professional recertiflcation, 
and research and teaching programs. Their concentration in South Florida reflects their hopes 
of retuming eventually to their homeland under a more auspicious political system. 
The last category, other Hispanics, is a potpourri of individuáis who identify a wide 
array of countríes as their ethnic origin. Many of them relate their birth or ancestry to El 
Salvador (565,000), the Dominican Republic (520,000), Spain (519,000), Colombia (379,000), 
Guatemala (269,000), Nicaragua (203,000), Ecuador (191,000), or Peni (175,000). In addition, 
1,403,000 persons do not classify themselves under any country of origin but use general 
reference terms such as "Hispano," "Latino," or "Spanish" [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993]. 
Each of the three major subgroups is the dominant Hispanic forcé in an área of the 
United States-Mexican Americans in the Southwest, Puerto Ricans in the New York and New 
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Jersey metropolitan áreas, and Cubans in South Florida-while being subordínate elsewhere. 
The vast economic, social, and political differences that exist among these áreas accentuate the 
distinct characteristics of origin of each subgroup and contribute to shape their adaptation and 
acculturation pattems. 
For example, as Moore and Pachón [1985] point out, agriculture and mining were the 
two fundamental sectors on which economic activity in the Southwest relied in the nineteenth 
century. A great deal of capital, along with large quantities of cheap and unskilled labor, were 
necessary to make the system work. Mexicans proved to be an ideal source of labor due to the 
proximity of their country of origin, and a pattem of workers' enclaves developed. 
Consequently, both urbanization and economic development in the Southwest have lagged the 
rest of the United States. Political maturity also has lagged, as organizations have been rather 
unstructured and statehood was not attained until relatively late. Instances of racial intolerance 
leading to antagonism and confrontation, such as cattle raids, expulsions and deportations, 
lynching, riots, and organized banditry, have been common. 
Although Puerto Ricans in New York and New Jersey have not experienced the 
persecution and border conflict endured by Mexican Americans in the Southwest, they have 
faced much the same prejudice and stereotyping. As a case in point, López [1982, p. 325] 
describes occasions in which "English and Spanish language newspapers, all owned and 
controlled by non-Puerto Ricans, invariably sensationalized the crimes of Puerto Ricans and 
gave Puerto Ricans an image of their people as crimináis..." The setting of their lives, 
predominantly urban, has been conditioned by the growing unemployment which has besieged 
the Snowbelt. 
In South Florida both economic development and ethnic diversity are direct 
consequences of migration. The first major wave of Cuban immigrants took place in the late 
1950s and throughout the 1960s, and was characterized by predominantly White and well-
educated individuáis with a remarkable propensity toward entrepreneurship. With subsequent 
immigration waves Hispanic businesses, mostly owned by Cubans, found substantial demand 
for their goods and services as well as an abundant and relatively inexpensive source of labor. 
Most Híspanles in South Florida work for, or with, other Híspanles, a situation which has led to 
the growth of an enclave economy with a strong grip on construction, real estáte, clothing, and 
restaurants. Both a sustained expansión of tourísm and the proliferation of International trade 
with Latin America and the Caribbean have contributed greatly to the South Florida boom, a 
boom which has established the Spanish language and Hispanic valúes and customs as a 
lifestyle. This environment has attracted numerous Híspanles, especially Colombians, 
Nican^uans, and El Salvadorans, who usually experience few difficulties in adapting to 
situations in which the meaning of their ethnicity is established by Cubans. 
Despite these and other intra-group differences. Híspanles oflen are aggregated into a 
single category which has become the basis of a national minority. DeFreitas [1991] and 
Moore and Pachón [1985] identify several reasons for this conceptual as well as practical 
aggregation. First, notwithstanding their historical backgrounds and sepárate identities. 
Híspanles share basic commonalities such as living in predominantly urban settings, 
experiencing poverty or at least relatively low levéis of income, and facing prejudice and 
discrimination. They are increasíngly being treated by socíety as a group with homogeneous 
traits and similar problems, some of them shared by other minorities, and are beginning to 
emerge as a potentially powerful and consistent political forcé. 
Second, Híspanles share important linguistic features—among them, widespread use 
of the Spanish language—and cultural valúes common to most people of Spanish descent. 
These cultural valúes establish a way of living, often determining attitudes regarding religión. 
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the family, and general outlook toward society. For example, some characteristics frequently 
associated with the Hispanic family include a patriarchal structure, reliance on cióse friends 
and family members beyond the nucleus, machismo attitudes, and a preference for many 
children, all reinforced by the use of Spanish as a means of expressing the distinctiveness of 
Hispanicity. 
Third, increasing acculturation by the various Hispanic subgroups leads them to 
disperse outside of their traditional áreas. While such dispersión tends to increase the 
nationwide heterogeneity of Hispanic ethnicity, it also increases the homogeneity of Híspanles 
when compared with other ethnic groups, especially in the eyes of non-Hispanics, who more 
often than not are unable to detect intra-Hispanic variations. Thus, an understanding of the true 
nature of Hispanicity as a dimensión of ethnic inequality can be gained oniy by identifying 
pattems in socioeconomic variables that sepárate Híspanles, as a single classification, from 
other ethnic groups, while also focusing on the differences that exist among Hispanic 
subgroups. 
2. Gfl\ERAL POPULAnONCHARACTERISTICS 
Between 1980 and 1990 the Hispanic population of the United States grew at an 
average annual rate of 4.3 percent, much more rapidly than did Non-Hispanic Whites (0.4 
percent) or Non-Hispanic Blacks (1.1 percent); only the "other" category, which includes 
mostly Asians, grew at a faster rate (6.0 percent) [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992]. Non-
Mexicans/Puerto Ricans/Cubans registered the greatest growth rate (5.3 percent), followed by 
Mexicans (4.4 percent). Puerto Ricans (3.0 percent), and Cubans (2.7 percent) [U.S. Bureau of 
the Census, 1993].^  
The recent substantial increase in the Hispanic population can be attributed to three 
major factors. One is the highest birth rate of all ethnic groups in the United States-27.0 per 
1,000 population in 1992 {vis-a-vis 13.7 per 1,000 population for Non-Hispanic Whites, 21.6 
per 1,000 population for Non-Hispanic Blacks, and 18.3 per 1,000 population for Asians and 
Pacific Islanders) [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1994]. The Hispanic birth rate has increased 
steadily in the last few years, from 23.2 per 1,000 population in 1980 and 26.0 per 1,000 
population in 1990. 
The second contributor to the Hispanic population explosión is a relatively high net 
migration rate~13.2 per 1,000 population in 1992, considerably higher than the net migration 
rates of 1.3 per 1,000 population of Non-Hispanic Whites and 2.9 per 1,000 population of Non-
Hispanic Blacks, although not as high as the 37.5 per 1,000 population rate of Asians and 
Pacific Islanders. Yet the Hispanic net migration rate has dropped appreciably in recent years, 
from 30.2 per 1,000 population in 1980 and 16.4 per 1,000 population in 1985. 
The rapidly increasing number of Hispanics also responds to enumeration procedural 
improvements such as clearer questionnaires, better population coverage, and an effective 
public-relations campaign incorporated into the 1990 Census. Especially effective in this 
respect were eñbrts by the Spanish-language media, both public and prívate organizations, and 
2. While, in the aggregate, these average annual growth rates are similar to the 1970-1980 rates 
(4.9 percent for Hispanics and 0.9 percent for non-Hispanics), they vary substantially among 
Hispanic subgroups: 6.8 percent for Mexicans, 3.9 percent for Cubans, 3.5 percent for Puerto 
Ricans, and 1.8 percent for other Hispanics [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993]. 
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community groups in raising awareness of the importance of being counted [U.S. Bureau of the 
Census. 1993]. 
Hispanics are geographically concentrated in a few states. California alone contains 
34.4 percent of the U.S. Hispanic population, followed by Texas with 19.4 percent, New York 
with 9.9 percent, and Florida with 7.0 percent [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993]. In terms of 
relative concentration, however, a different picture emerges. It is estimated that New México 
has the greatest incidence of Hispanic out of total population (40.9 percent), followed by Texas 
(28.3 percent) and Arizona (20.9 percent). Other states with a strong relative presence of 
Hispanics are Colorado (13.8 percent). Florida (13.7 percent), and New York (13.0 percent) 
[U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1994]. 
Hispanics tend to concéntrate in cities, especially in places where a large number of 
Hispanics already live. According to the 1990 Census [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992], 91.4 
percent of U.S. Hispanics live in urban áreas; only 73.6 percent of non-Hispanics are urban 
dweilers. Moreover, over half (52.2 percent) of Hispanics live in central cities, compared with 
29.7 percent of non-Hispanics. (Unlike Hispanics, the 1980-1990 shift of non-Hispanics to 
metropolitan áreas has been to áreas outside the central cities.) Cubans and Puerto Ricans 
register the greatest incidence of urban dwelling (97.1 percent and 96.2 percent, respectively), 
but Puerto Ricans are gathered in central cities (70.6 percent) to a much greater extent than are 
Cubans (46.9 percent). Other Hispanics (93.0 percent urban, 53.5 percent in central cities) and 
Mexicans (89.4 percent urban, 48.4 percent in central cities) follow. More than 50 cities 
register an incidence of at least 20 percent Hispanic population. These cities and their relative 
percentages are listed in Appendix 1. 
The racial composition of Hispanics (51.7 percent White, 3.4 percent Black, and 44.9 
percent other, mostly Native Americans or American Indians) is quite different from the 
composition of non-Hispanics (83.1 percent White, 12.9 percent Black, and 4.0 percent other) 
[U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992]. The age composition also vanes with ethnicity, Hispanics 
showing the youngest median age of all ethnic groups, 25.5 years, compared with 34.9 years 
for Non-Hispanic Whites, 28.1 years for Non-Hispanic Blacks, and 26.4 years for others. 
About one out of every three Hispanics (34.7 percent) is younger than 18 years, substantially 
greater than the incidence of non-Hispanics of all races (24.7 percent); conversely, the 
incidence of persons 65 years and older is much greater for non-Hispanics (13.3 percent) than 
for Hispanics (5.2 percent). Major intra-ethnic variations are detected, however, as the age 
distributions of Mexicans (23.8 years median age, 37.6 percent younger than 18 years, and 4.2 
percent 65 years and older) and Puerto Ricans (25.7 years, 35.2 percent, and 4.9 percent, 
respectively) are much younger than the distríbution of Cubans (38.9 years, 17.9 percent, and 
16.1 percent, respectively). The age distríbution of other Hispanics (27.7 years, 30.1 percent, 
and 5.6 percent, respectively) is older than the distributions of Mexicans and Puerto Ricans, but 
younger than the distribution of Cubans [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992]. 
The 22,354,059 Americans of Hispanic origin enumerated in the 1990 Census form 
6,001,718 households, which yields an average of 3.53 persons per household, much greater 
than the 2.57 persons per household recorded for the non-Hispanic population. Mexicans show 
the largest average household size (3.80 persons), followed by other Hispanics (3.33 persons). 
Puerto Ricans (3.15 persons), and Cubans (2.78 persons). Hispanic households are more likely 
to be family households (79.8 percent) than are non-Hispanic households (69.5 percent). 
More than two out of three (68.9 percent) Hispanic ñimilies are maintained by 
married couples, which is somewhat less than the incidence of non-Hispanic families (79.4 
percent); 22.2 percent are maintained by a female head of family with no husband present, 
compared with 16.1 percent for non-Hispanic families; and the remaining 8.9 percent are 
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headed by a man with no wife present, compared with 4.5 percent for non-Hispanic families. 
(The proportion of both Hispanic and non-Hispanic families maintained by a woman with no 
husband present has increased since 1970 [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993].) As with other 
indicators, there are substantial variations here among Hispanic subgroups. Cubans report 
relatively high levéis of family stability, with 77.0 percent of families maintained by married 
couples, 16.8 percent maintained by female heads, and 6.2 percent maintained by male heads, 
followed by Mexicans (71.9 percent, 18.8 percent, and 9.3 percent, respectively), other 
Hispanics (66.7 percent, 23.5 percent, and 9.8 percent, respectively), and Puerto Ricans (55.6 
percent, 36.8 percent, and 7.6 percent, respectively). 
Relatively more Hispanics than non-Hispanics 15 years 6f age and older report never 
having been married (34.9 percent and 26.2 percent, respectively), while the opposite is true of 
persons married at the time of the 1990 Census (49.7 percent of Hispanics, 55.3 percent of non-
Hispanics). The incidence of the rest of the population 15 years of age and older-separated, 
divorced, and widowed persons~is approximately the same for Hispanics (15.4 percent) and 
non-Hispanics (18.5 percent). Current Population Survey data for 1993 show that Hispanics 
tend to marry overwhelmingly within their ethnic subgroup, and when they marry outside their 
specific subgroup, they are more likely to marry a non-Hispanic than a member of any other 
Hispanic subgroup. Mexicans and Cubans, the two subgroups with relatively higher levéis of 
family stability, marry within their subgroup to a much greater extent than do Puerto Ricans 
and other Hispanics [Montgomery, 1994]. 
Hispanic American families are more likely to have children present than are non-
Hispanic families. In the 1990 Census, 63.3 percent of Hispanic families report children under 
18 years of age living with them, compared to 46.6 percent of non-Hispanic families. The 
diflFerential, however, is smaller for families reporting children under six years of age living 
with them (16.3 percent for Hispanics, 11.9 percent for non-Hispanics). 
Within the Hispanic ethnic group, only 41.4 percent and 11.1 percent of Cuban 
families report having children under 18 years and under six years of age, respectively, living 
with them, a much lower incidence than reported by Mexicans (66.5 percent and 16.7 percent, 
respectively). Puerto Ricans (63.9 percent and 16.1 percent, respectively), and other Hispanics 
(60.8 percent and 16.7 percent, respectively). The incidence of Hispanic families reporting 
children under 18 years oíd and under six years oíd living with them is similar for married-
couple families (64.7 percent and 17.0 percent, respectively), female householders without a 
husband (65.7 percent and 13.8 percent, respectively), and, to a lesser extent, male 
householders without a wife (46.7 percent and 16.7 percent, respectively). 
i. ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
According to the Statistical Abstract [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1994], the 1993 
median weekly eamings of Hispanic full-time wage-and-salary workers ($335) is 29.9 percent 
less than the eamings of Whites ($478) and 9.5 percent less than the eamings of Blacks 
($370).^  For 1990 the gap is 28.1 percent and 6.7 percent less, respectively ($307 for 
Hispanics, $427 for Whites, and $329 for Blacks). Thus, during the first three years of this 
3. The White and Black categories in this comparison refer to race. Consequently, they include 
Hispanics, since the term "Hispanic" refers to an ethnic category. 
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decade. Hispanics' eamings deteriorated vis-a-vis the eamings of non-Hispanics. In fact, the 
Hispanic annual median household income in constant (1992) doilars actually dropped-from 
$24,803 in 1989 to $23,970 in 1990, $23,374 in 1991, and $22,848 in 1992. Although the 
incomes of all ethnic groups declined during this period because of the recession, the relative 
position of Hispanics deteriorated, as their median household income in 1989 was 27.9 less 
than the income of Whites, but in 1992 it was 29.4 percent less. 
The 1993 median weekly full-time wage-and-salary eamings of Hispanic men 
exceeds by 12.1 percent the eamings of Hispanic women. (The magnitude of this differential is 
smaller than the 15.0 percent reported in 1990.) Yet, inter-ethnic comparisons by gender reveal 
that Hispanic men are relatively vvorse off than are Hispanic women. While Hispanic women's 
1993 eamings are 22.1 percent and 10.0 percent less than the eamings of White and Black 
women, respectively, the eamings of Hispanic men vis-a-vis White and Black men are 33.7 
percent and 10.2 percent less, respectively. 
The 1993 weekly wage-and-salary eamings of married-couple families ($566) are 
60.3 percent greater than the eamings of families maintained by women with no husband 
present ($353) and 31.0 percent greater than the eamings of families maintained by men with 
no wife present ($432). When both husband and wife work, the median eamings of married-
couple families are $733 per week, but when only one of them works, weekly eamings drop to 
$365 if the eamer is the husband or $262 if the eamer is the wife. 
Data from the 1993 Current Population Survey [Montgomery, 1994] also indícate that 
the 1992 Hispanic median annual family income ($23,912) is substantially less (37.1 percent) 
than the income of non-Hispanics ($38,015). By far Cubans are the Hispanic subgroup with the 
highest level of family income ($31,015), followed by Mexicans ($23,714) and Puerto Ricans 
($20,301). Other Hispanics ($25,342) eam more than Mexicans but less than Cubans. 
There are noticeable differences in the income distributions of Hispanic and non-
Hispanic families as well as among Hispanic subgroups. More than half (52.0 percent) of the 
Hispanic families included in the 1993 Current Population Survey [Montgomery, 1994] eam 
under $25,000 per year, compared with only 30.7 percent of non-Hispanic families. By the 
same token, while 16.7 percent of Hispanic families eam $50,000 or more, non-Hispanic 
families register twice that incidence (34.8 percent). Cubans exhibit the most favorable 
distribution of all Hispanic subgroups (41.3 percent under $25,000, 27.0 percent $50,000 or 
more), while Puerto Ricans (59.9 percent and 14.6 percent, respectively) and Mexicans (52.3 
percent and 14.9 percent, respectively) show the least favorable. Other Hispanics rank in the 
middle (49.3 percent under $25,000,20.4 percent $50,000 or more). 
The incidence of Hispanic families living below the poverty level declined between 
1982 (27.2 percent) and 1989 (23.4 percent), only to increase (26.2 percent) in 1992. This 
percentage is two and one-half times greater than the incidence reported by non-Hispanic 
families (10.4 percent). The Hispanic poverty incidence is so widespread that more than one in 
every six (18.0 percent) persons living in poverty in the United States is of Hispanic origin. 
The poverty incidence within Hispanic families is greatest for Puerto Ricans (32.5 percent) and 
lowest for Cubans (15.4 percent). Mexican (26.4 percent) and other Hispanic families (25.2 
percent) lie in between. 
Hispanic families with children under 18 years of age are more likely to live below 
the poverty level than are Hispanic families without children. In fact, 39.9 percent of all 
Hispanic children live below the poverty level, compared with less than half of that incidence 
(19.5 percent) for non-Hispanic children. Both Hispanic and non-Hispanic families headed by 
women with no husband present register a very high poverty incidence (48.8 percent and 33.3 
percent, respectively). 
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One of the reasons why Hispanics tend to be poor is their relatively high levéis of 
unemployment. According to the 1993 Current Population Survey [Montgomery, 1994], the 
Hispanic unemployment rate dropped substantially after the end of the economic recession in 
1983 until shortly before the economic recession of 1989, from 16.5 percent to 7.8 percent, but 
it increased to 11.9 percent in 1993 following the economic downtum. Hispanics experience a 
much higher unemployment rate than do non-Hispanics—11.9 percent vis-a-vis 7.1 percent. 
Cubans record a significantly lower rate (7.3 percent) than do Mexicans (11.7 percent), other 
Hispanics (12.4 percent), or Puerto Ricans (14.4 percent). 
The overall Hispanic male unemployment rate (12.4 percent) is slightly higher than 
the female rate (11.1 percent), although broad variations by gender are detected among 
subgroups. The Puerto Rican male rate (17.2 percent) is much higher than the female rate (11.0 
percent), while neither Mexicans (12.1 percent male, 11.1 percent female) ñor Cubans (7.6 
percent male, 7.3 percent female) show appreciable inter-gender difTerences. For Hispanics of 
Central and South American origin the unemployment rate of women (14.4 percent) exceeds 
the unemployment rate of men (12.4 percent). 
Inter-ethnic difTerences in unemployment exist despite identical rates of labor forcé 
participation (65.5 percent) for Hispanics and non-Hispanics. Within Hispanics, however, 
major difTerences appear among subgroups, as Puerto Ricans (56.1 percent) and Cubans (57.5 
percent) register lower rates than do Mexicans (66.6 percent) and other Hispanics (68.8 
percent). Overall, differences in labor forcé participation rates by gender do exist. The Hispanic 
male rate (79.2 percent) is greater than the non-Hispanic male rate (74.2 percent), while the 
Hispanic female rate (51.9 percent) is lower than the rate of non-Hispanic women (57.6 
percent). The rather wide inter-gender participation-rate gap is common to all Hispanic 
subgroups. 
Another reason for the high Hispanic poverty incidence is the unfavorable 
occupational structure of this ethnic group's employed labor forcé. Hispanics are more likely 
than non-Hispanics to be employed in low-paying, less stable occupations such as operators, 
fabricators, and laborers (22.9 percent vis-a-vis 13.5 percent) or in farming, forestry, and 
fishing (6.0 percent vis-a-vis 2.3 percent). Only 13.1 percent report their occupation as 
manageríal or professional specialties, compared to 28.8 percent for non-Hispanics. Cubans 
have the most favorable occupational structure of all subgroups, as 19.5 percent of the 
employed labor forcé are managers or professionals, followed closely by other Hispanics (17.2 
percent). Mexicans and Puerto Ricans show the lowest incidence of mans^erial or professional 
specialties-10.6 percent for Mexicans and 16.9 percent for Puerto Ricans. 
Despite their relatively lower eamings, women exhibit a more favorable occupational 
structure than do men. Regardless of ethnicity, the female incidence of managers and 
professionals (15.4 percent for Hispanics, 29.8 percent for non-Hispanics) is greater than the 
male incidence (11.6 percent for Hispanics, 27.9 percent for non-Hispanics). The presence of 
women in technical, sales, and administrative support occupations (40.9 percent for Hispanics, 
42.9 percent for non-Hispanics) also exceeds the presence of men (15.4 percent for Hispanics, 
21.5 percent for non-Hispanics). At the other end, the presence of men in lower-paying 
occupations such as farming, forestry, and físhing (8.9 percent for Hispanics, 3.7 percent for 
non-Hispanics) is greater than the presence of women (1.8 percent for Hispanics, 0.8 percent 
for non-Hispanics), and relatively more men (28.4 percent for Hispanics, 19.0 percent for non-
Hispanics) than women (14.8 percent for Hispanics, 7.2 percent for non-Hispanics) are found 
in the operators, fabricators, and laborers category. 
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4. SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Perhaps the universal, most common concomitant of poverty and low levéis of 
income is insufficient formal schooling [Carvajal, 1979; Carvajal and Geithman, 1976: 
Carvajal, Morris, and Davenport, 1993]. Hispanics in the United States are no exception. The 
1991 median, annual eamings of Hispanic male, year-round, fijll-time workers. 25-64 years 
oíd, increase with formal schooling—from $14,690 for workers who never completed ninth 
grade to $17,090 for workers with some high school education but without a diploma, $21,633 
for high school graduates, $27,293 for workers with some college instruction but without a 
degree, $30,096 for workers with an associate (two-year) college degree, $32,857 for workers 
with a baccalaureate degree, and $37,832 for workers with a master's degree. At each 
educational leve!, Hispanic women eam less than do Hispanic men (U.S. Bureau of the Census, 
1993], and when the family householder is not a high school gradúate, the overall 1992 
Hispanic poverty incidence goes up from 26.2 percent to 37.0 percent-from 26.4 percent to 
36.2 percent for Mexicans, from 32.5 percent to 48.2 percent for Puerto Ricans, from 15.4 
percent to 24.2 percent for Cubans, and from 25.2 percent to 36.8 percent for other Hispanics 
[Montgomery, 1994]. 
Although the proportion of U.S. Hispanics 25 years and older with less than flfth-
grade schooling has declined recently, from 15.6 percent in 1983 to 11.8 percent in 1993. it 
remains well above the 1993 proportion of non-Hispanics (1.3 percent) with less than fifth-
grade education [Montgomery, 1994]. During the same period, the proportion of Hispanics at 
least 25 years oíd who have eamed a high school diploma has increased sharply, from 45.7 
percent to 53.1 percent, while the incidence of college graduates has grown mildly, from 8.0 
percent to 9.0 percent. Hispanics living in New México, Colorado, and Florida register the 
highest levéis of schooling, while the lowest levéis are reported by Hispanics living in Texas, 
Illinois, and California [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993]. 
Of all Hispanic subgroups, Mexicans exhibit the lowest level of educational 
attainment, with 15.4 percent of Mexican Americans in the 1993 Current Population Survey 
showing less than fifth-grade completion, 46.2 percent with a high school diploma, and 5.9 
percent with a college degree [Montgomery, 1994]. Puerto Ricans have the second lowest level 
of schooling-8.2 percent having completed less than fifth grade, 59.8 percent high school 
graduates, and 8.0 percent college graduates. At the other end, Cubans (5.3 percent, 62.1 
percent, and 16.5 percent, respectively) and other Hispanics (6.0 percent, 65.1 percent, and 
15.2 percent, respectively) exhibit much higher levéis of schooling. 
On average, younger Hispanics (25-34 years oíd) are better educated than are older 
Hispanics (35 years and older). They register a substantially lower incidence of under fifth-
grade schooling (5.4 percent versus 15.3 percent) and a greater incidence of high school 
graduates (60.4 percent versiis 49.1 percent). Yet, younger Hispanics are not more likely to 
hold a college degree than are older Hispanics. 
Educational attainment may be híndered by the inability to speak English well. In 
addition to the obvious shortcomings associated with less educational attainment, individuáis 
with a weak command of the English language are likely to bear labor-market costs due to 
limited Communications skills that limit their potential income growth, such as problems in job 
searching or failure to realize on-the-job productivity gains. According to the 1990 Census 
[U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1992], nearly 32 million persons five years of age and older in the 
United States speak at home a language other than English. Spanish is by far the most common 
foreign language, spoken by over 17 million persons, or 54.5 percent of those who speak a 
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foreign language in the home. Among Spanish speakers, about 8.3 million do not speak 
English well at all. 
Many persons who speak at home a language other than English are foreign bom. 
Approximately 37 percent of all foreign-bom persons enumerated in the 1990 Census have 
migrated from Spanish-speaking countries in Latin America. Nearly three-fifths (58.7 percent) 
of foreign-bom Hispanics are from México. Cubans constitute the second most numerous 
single subgroup, with 10.1 percent. Other important immigrant concentrations are from El 
Salvador (6.4 percent), the Dominican Republic (4.8 percent), Colombia (4.0 percent), and 
Guatemala (3.1 percent). 
Finally, an analysis of Hispanics in the United States would not be adequate if 
prejudice and discrimination were omitted. Prejudice refers to attitudes of aversión and 
hostility toward members of a group simply because they are presumed to share some 
objectionable quality ascribed to the group [Devine, 1989]. Thus, prejudice is a state of mind-a 
feeling, opinión, or disposition. In a society in which people may be classified by the color of 
their skin, their cultural valúes, their accent, or any other such characteristic, and in which a 
dominant group emerges at the expense of other, minority groups, discrimination occurs when 
minority group members, in this case Hispanics, find structural barriers in the lavvful pursuit of 
their welfare which lead them into economic and social deprivation. 
Discrimination may be overtly expressed or institutionally practiced. Overt 
discrimination involves a sense of superiority by dominant group members with respect to 
Hispanics, a feeling that Hispanics are, by their very nature, difTerent and alien, and the belief 
that dominant group members have a proprietary claim to privilege, basis of merit, skills, or 
talent which Hispanics do not possess. According to Pachón and DeSipio [1994], most persons 
within each Hispanic subgroup, except Cubans, perceive that U.S. society discriminates against 
Hispanics. 
When discrimination becomes institutionalized, overt discrimination and the prejudice 
associated with it become less important causes of structural barriers because inadequate 
education, lower expected retums on human capital investments, and segregated labor market 
institutions that deny equal access to jobs, training, or information substantially reduce the 
probability that Hispanics aspire to, prepare for, or seek to enter status occupations. The 
empirical evidence in this respect is overwhelming. In a recent study comparing the treatment 
of Chicago and San Diego Hispanic and Anglo seekers of low-skill, entry-level jobs, Cross et 
al. [1990] found that, after controlling for education, work experience, and other relevant 
variables, discrimination against Hispanics accounts for a significant portion of the disparate 
hiring practices encountered by male applicants. In another study, Melendez [1991] concluded 
that discrimination explains a large portion of the w^e gap between non-Hispanic and 
Hispanic New Yorkers. And in still another study, a team of researchers fix)m M R D 
Consulting [1993] determined that Hispanic-owned finns are victims of discrimination when 
they attempt to do business with Metropolitan Dade County, Florida. Thus, it seems that 
Hispanic/non-Hispanic income and poverty differentials are not dictated solely by historícal 
factors or current market forces, but also are influenced by overt and/or institutional 
discrimination. 
Hispanic households are more likely than non-Hispanic households to receive Means-
tested Assistance. (Means-tested Assistance includes cash benefits received from Aid to 
Families with Dependent Children, General Assistance, Supplemental Security Income, and 
means-tested veterans compensation of pensions; it also includes Medicaid benefits, food 
stamps, subsidies fix)m free or reduced-price school lunches, and rent subsidies.) Half (48.5 
percent) of all persons living in Hispanic households receive some type of Means-tested 
92 Manuel J. Carvajal 
Assistance, compared with one-flfth (20.6 percent) of persons living in non-Hispanic 
households [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993]. The most common programs are Medicaid 
benefits (30.0 percent of Hispanics, 13.3 percent of non-Hispanics), food stamps (19.8 percent 
of Hispanics, 9.3 percent of non-Hispanics), and cash assistance (18.7 percent of Hispanics, 
10.1 percent of non-Hispanics). 
5. THE FUTURE OF U.S. HISPAMCS 
The behavior, development, and impact of U.S. Hispanics throughout the first half of 
the twenty-first century will be influenced by an array of complex and often misunderstood 
variables, trends, and events, some of which have been unfolding for some time and continué 
to unfold, and others which may arise suddenly or unexpectedly. While no glimpse iiito the 
ftiture can possibly anticipate all contingentes, any credible, ftiture scenario of Hispanic life is 
likely to be conditioned by several projected characteristics which may be safely assumed to 
conform to reality. 
The flrst projection is that this ethnic group will continué to expand rapidly, not only 
because of immigration, but also from very high birth rates. According to the middle-series 
population projections by the Bureau of the Census, the number of Hispanics in the United 
States is expected to increase to 39.3 million by 2010, 59.2 million by 2030, and 80.7 million 
by 2050 [U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993]. These numbers suggest the emergence of a 
growing political forcé with a huge potential. 
Yet, Hispanics do not seem to particípate much politically, as other groups do. They 
do not run for political office, vote, or register to vote as often as other ethnic groups. Foreign-
bom Hispanics pursue naturalÍ2ation less often than foreign-bom non-Hispanics. With the 
exception of Cubans, who exhibit very high rates of naturalization, probably due to their 
inability to obtain proper representation and protection from their country of origin, foreign-
bom Hispanics do not seem to be very interested in becoming U.S. citizens. If Hispanics are to 
gain control over their own destiny, they must be able to influence political processes and 
outcomes, as important issues such as bilingual education and welfare benefits for immigrants 
arise in the next few years. 
The second projection regarding the fiiture of Hispanics is that their projected growth 
is likely to occur within the context of a major shift in the overall ethnic composition of the 
United States. This shift is largely the result of the immigration legislation of 1965, which for 
the first time allowed into the U.S. large numbers of non-European immigrants~not only Latin 
Amerícans, but also Chínese, Asiatic Indians, Filipinos, Vietnamese, and others whose cultures 
and goals have little in common with the traditional American mainstream. In fact, insofar as 
the new immigrants may be reluctant to abandon readily many traits of their original cultures, 
the American mainstream is likely to mutate to a much greater extent than ever before, and the 
past dominant/majority culture or ethnic group will actually become a minority, although 
probably far from disadvantaged. 
The third projection is that Hispanicity will remain as a dimensión of ethnic inequality 
because of the persisten! influx into the country of poor, unskilled workers and continuously 
high birth rates. The relatively few gains in educational attaínment, occupational structure, or 
income that may occur in selected áreas as certain subgroups and/or individuáis gain añluence 
in their special niches are likely to be eclípsed by prevailing poverty unless widespread and 
aggressive human capital investment programs oriented toward Hispanics are instituted 
nationwide. 
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The importance of acquiring more and better education and skills to improve 
Hispanics' employment situation is evident. Educational institutions, especial ly those located in 
urban áreas, may have to change their curricula in order to be more accessible and relevant to 
Hispanics and other minorities. Yet the Federal Government does not opérate schools; state 
and local authorities do. Thus, while the Federal Government has the power to change 
appropríations for schooling and encourage changes in the public school systems that serve 
low-income students, the real policy decisions rest with states and municipalities. 
The fourth projection focuses on perceptions and reactions by the rest of society. 
Hispanics' young population composition, high unemployment rates, and low levéis of income 
will be a growing source of pressure on the health, educational, welfare, and criminal justice 
systems. Therefore, the fiíture of Hispanics will be increasingly viewed by non-Hispanics as a 
collective problem, a challenge likely to brew fürther prejudice, discrimination, and, ultimately, 
polarízation of society. 
Finally, as Hispanics evolve more into a national minority, rather than a fragmented 
set of regional subgroups, each confined to a part of the country, their presence will become 
more noticeable in cities which have had no awareness of a Hispanic minority. With more 
Hispanics resettling throughout the United States and not necessaríly conforming to traditional 
pattems of subgroup concentration, the composition of the Hispanic nuclei will become more 
heterogeneous Cultural traits from any one particular country of origin are likely to be replaced 
by other, eclectic cultural traits developed by~and within~the larger, heterogeneous ethnic 
group, reflecting the group's reality and responding to its necessities. This may spark the 
formation of a true Hispanic culture, increasingly integrated by cotnmon concems, 
autochthonous artistic expressions, a pervasive media, and civic and political affiliations, 
whose members identify themselves less as Mexicans, Puerto Rlcans, Cubans, etc. and more as 
U.S. Hispanics. 
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Appendix I 
U.S. cities of 100,000 or more inhabitants and at least 20 percent Hispanic population. 




El Monte, California 
El Paso, Texas 
Santa Ana, California 
Miami, Florida 




Corpus Christi, Texas 
Ontario, California 
Paterson, New Jersey 
Los Angeles, California 
Elizabeth, New Jersey 
Inglewood, California 
Chula Vista, California 
San Bemardino, California 







































City and State 
San José, California 
Bridgeport, Connecticut 
Newark, New Jersey 
Riverside, California 
Stockton, California 
New York, New York 
Jersey City, New Jersey 
Hayward, California 
Long Beach, California 












San Diego, California 
Bakersfield, California 


































Source: U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States 1994 
(Washington, D.C.: 1994). 
